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offense in order to obtain evidence of *•-
commission for prosecution by methods 
creating a substantial risk that the offense 
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Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding, defendant was found 
guilty as charged (R. 131). On January 14, 1985, Judge Banks 
sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison (R. 133A). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Conflicting evidence was presented at trial. The 
following facts support the jury's verdict. 
Charles Hafen, a police officer for the South Salt Lake 
Police Department, was first assigned to Metro Narcotics as an 
undercover agent on September 1, 1982. About one month later, 
Hafen began to investigate drug traffic at "Caesars," a South 
Salt Lake City night club, based upon a tip he received from 
another narcotics agent that Caesars was a center for cocaine 
distribution (R. 247, 399). 
Hafen was introduced to Toby Wells by Officer Barbara 
Mann, another undercover agent acquainted with Wells, at a Salt 
Lake City restaurant on the evening of October 6, 1982 (R. 248, 
277-78). That evening, Hafen told Wells that he wanted to obtain 
a large amount of cocaine to sell in Salt Lake City (R. 249). 
Wells responded that he had previously been a middleman for large 
cocaine transactions and knew several people who could supply a 
large amount of cocaine. Wells mentioned in particular an 
individual who delivered pounds of cocaine from Lake Tahoe to 
Salt Lake City and an individual who had $150,000 set aside for 
nothing but cocaine deals (R. 249) . Hafen then told Wells that 
he wanted to purchase a pound of cocaine and that he had raised 
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(R. 324)• Wells first contacted defendant about purchasing 
cocaine when Hafen desired a sample gram. In response to Wells's 
requestr defendant said, "I don't know. I will see what I can 
do." Defendant did not call Wells back (R. 331-32). Wells again 
contacted defendant about purchasing cocaine, but defendant 
indicated that he was "still looking around" (R. 332). After 
receiving a telephone call from Hafen in which Hafen told Wells 
he was out of town collecting money, Wells telephoned defendant 
and asked him if he could secure a pound of cocaine. Defendant 
responded that he could not, but that he would "look and see" 
(R. 336-37). Several days later, Wells again asked defendant 
about the cocaine, but received the same answer (R. 337-38). 
On October 26, 1982, Wells telephoned defendant and 
told him that he had seen the money and these people wanted to do 
business; "Itlhey weren't screwing around." Defendant responded, 
"No, I will check and see what I can do." Defendant did not get 
back to Wells (R. 339-40). The next evening, having called and 
spoken with Hafen, Wells contacted defendant. This time, 
defendant said, "Okayl,] . . . let's see what we can do" (R. 
341). After Wells had made several calls to both Hafen and 
defendant, Weils and Hafen met and then drove to defendant's 
residence, where Hafen was to purchase one pound of cocaine for 
$35,000 (R. 252-53).1 The price for the cocaine had been quoted, 
without negotiation, to Hafen by Wells (R. 252). 
1
 Wells testified that defendant did not finally consent to the 
sale until after Wells met Hafen and called defendant and told 
him, "I got the money right here" (R. 342) . 
-4-
As Hafen and Wells arrived at defendant's residencef 
Hafen told Wells that he would like to make the transaction in 
his van (R. 254). Shortly after Wells went inside defendant's 
house to speak with defendant about the procedure for the 
transaction defendantf whom Hafen had never met (R. 255) , came 
out of his house with Wells and looked Hafen over* When Hafen 
told defendant that he was worried about sending the money inside 
the house with Wells and having the cocaine come out, defendant 
replied, "Well, the dope is not here, but it will be here any 
minute" (R. 256). Just then a car pulled into defendant's 
driveway. A woman carrying a small package in her hand got out 
of the car and entered the house. Defendant followed her into 
the house, only to return minutes later to tell Hafen that they 
would make the cocaine deal inside (R. 256-58). 
Hafen agreed and carried his weighing scales and money 
into defendant's house. In the kitchen, defendant handed Hafen a 
package of cocaine from the top of the refrigerator in exchange 
for Hafen's bag of money. Defendant dumped the money onto the 
kitchen table and stated that the cocaine, which was "all rock,"2 
would be $35,000 (R. 265). While defendant counted the money, 
Hafen weighed and tested the cocaine (R. 267) . Hafen told 
defendant he was "a little bit nervous" because defendant's wife 
was walking around, and asked if defendant's wife could sit down. 
Defendant responded, "Don't get nervous and relax and you won't 
get killed" (R. 269) . 
2
 Cocaine in "rock" form is high quality cocaine that does not 
contain large amounts of a cutting agent (R. 265). 
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After the cocaine and money had changed hands, Hafen 
walked out of d e f e n d a n t s house with Wel l s , whereupon Wells was 
arrested (R. 312 ) . Defendant ran out the back door with the bag 
of money (R. 312) . Another p o l i c e o f f i c e r , who was wai t ing in 
the backyard, apprehended and arrested defendant as he f l e d with 
the $35,000 (R. 313) . After defendant's arres t and pursuant to a 
search warrant, o f f i c e r s searched defendant's house and found a 
loaded .38 ca l iber p i s t o l on top of the re fr igerator next to 
where the cocaine had been (R. 401) . They a l so found an 
expensive , soph i s t i ca ted sca le (R. 402) . 
At t r i a l , Hafen t e s t i f i e d that at no time did he grab 
or shake defendant, or t e l l defendant that he would have to go 
through with the deal because Hafen had raised a large amount of 
money (R. 286-87, 401) . Nor did defendant ever t e l l Hafen that 
he did not want to go through with the deal (R. 297-98, 400 -01 ) . 
Also , in Hafen's opinion and the opinion of another o f f i c e r with 
expert i se in n a r c o t i c s , the usual price for a pound of cocaine of 
the qua l i ty involved in the transact ion with defendant was 
between $32,000 and $35,000 (R. 305, 403, 4 0 6 ) . 
At t r i a l , defendant c a l l e d two wi tnesses in h i s 
defense . Toby Wells t e s t i f i e d t h a t , contrary to Charles Hafen1s 
test imony, he had become acquainted with Hafen prior to October 
6, 1982 and never met with him on that date (R. 325) . However, 
he acknowledged that he attempted to l o c a t e narcot ic s for Hafen 
af ter Hafen approached him about purchasing narcot i c s (R.. 328-
29 ) . Wells s ta ted that Hafen was "always c a l l i n g , " and that h i s 
requests for cocaine e sca la ted from 1/4 ounce to 1/2 ounce,to a 
- 6 -
full ounce, and then to a pound (R. 330, 336) . Hafen offered him 
$2500 and some cocaine to arrange a buy of one pound of cocaine 
(R. 346). 
Wells further testified that Hafen directed him to tell 
his source that Hafen wished to break family ties in Colorado and 
begin his own business in Salt Lake City. Wells was also to 
inform his source that Hafen had shown him money and was serious 
about purchasing a large quantity of cocaine (R. 347-49)• 
Finally, he claimed that when he and Hafen arrived at defendant's 
house and defendant indicated that he did not want to go through 
with the deal, Hafen stuck the money in defendant's face and 
said, "No, we went through all this trouble. You are not going 
to back out now." Hafen then grabbed defendant, swung him 
around, and called him names (R. 343-44). 
Defendant himself took the stand and testified to the 
following facts. At the time of the drug transaction, he was a 
roofer, farmer, and horse trainer, earning approximately $18,000 
a year (R. 371-72). He and Wells had been to the other's home on 
several occasions, and they and their wives had double-dated 
often. Each had lent the other money (R. 373). 
Sometime in August of 1982, Wells first contacted 
defendant about the purchase of cocaine. At that time, Wells 
wanted an ounce. Defendant told him that he did not know where 
to get an ounce, but that he would "keep [his] eyes open" and "if 
[he] heard anything, [he] would get back to [Wells] (R. 374-75)." 
During the two month period that followed, Wells telephoned him 
over fifty times and visited his home three or four times, asking 
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whether he had located any cocaine (R. 383). Each time, 
defendant said that he had not, but that he would continue to 
"look around" (R. 375-76). With respect to one occasion on which 
defendant gave such an assurance to Wellsf defendant explained 
that he did so because he "didn't want to hurt [Wells's] feelings 
and tell him [he] wasn't going to do it." However, he admitted 
that the only time he actually told Wells he did not want to deal 
"was later on" (R. 375). Defendant never initiated a call to 
Wells (R. 383) . 
Wells first requested an ounce of cocaine from 
defendant, but the desired quantity soon escalated to a quarter 
pound and then to one pound. Wells told defendant that the 
prospective buyer wished to discontinue buying drugs from family 
members in Colorado, and that Wells and he could "make a bunch of 
money" by arranging the drug sale (R. 376-77). Again, defendant 
told Wells that he was still looking around. However, defendant 
subsequently made contact with a person who would sell a pound of 
cocaine for $20,000 (R. 377-78). When Wells telephoned and 
informed him that Wells's people had $35,000 for a pound, 
defendant first declined to sell, but then consented (R. 379-80). 
After Wells and Hafen arrived at defendant's house, 
defendant told Hafen that he was not going to make the sale. 
Hafen grabbed defendant by the arm and said, "I went through a 
lot of trouble to put this money together. I had to go through a 
lot of people to get this money and you are not going to punk out 
on me now" (R. 381). As defendant turned to walk away, Hafen 
grabbed him and swung him around. Defendant felt a solid object 
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on Hafen, which he thought to be a gun. This scared him, and 
shortly thereafter Wells, Hafen, defendant, and "Susan," who had 
just arrived, entered defendant's house to make the sale. While 
inside, in response to a sudden move by Hafen, defendant said to 
him, "Don't get nervous and shoot one of my kids" (R. 381-82). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a notice of intent to 
rely on the defense of entrapment (R. 66). On April 27, 1984, 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(4), defendant presented his 
evidence of entrapment to the trial court, Judge Homer F. 
Wilkinson, presiding (R. 77, 149-226). After hearing defendant's 
and the State's evidence, which consisted of essentially the same 
evidence subsequently presented at trial, Judge Wilkinson denied 
defendant's request that the case be dismissed due to entrapment 
(R. 77, 226). He based that ruling primarily on the conflicting 
testimony received, observing that the opposing testimony created 
a jury question on the issue of entrapment (R. 225-26) (see 
Addendum)• At trial, defendant presented his entrapment defense 
to the jury (R. 420-30; Instruction Nos. 19 and 20 (R. 124-25)). 
The jury, nevertheless, found defendant guilty as charged (R. 
131, 437). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under Utah's objective test of entrapment, the evidence 
presented at trial did not raise a reasonable doubt on the issue 
of entrapment. Furthermore, given the facts of this case, the 
holding of People v. Mclntire. 153 Cal. Rptr. 237, 591 P..2d 527 
(1979), concerning entrapment and an "unwitting agent," is not 
applicable. There being no dispute as to the sufficiency of the 
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evidence to support defendant's conviction for distribution, his 
conviction should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF 
HIS CONVICTION ON A THEORY OF ENTRAPMENT. 
Defendant argues that he was entrapped, and thus the 
trial court erroneously declined to dismiss the charge against 
him prior to trial under UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-303(4) and (5) 
(1978). He further contends that the jury must have had a 
reasonable doubt on the issue of entrapment, and therefore his 
conviction should be reversed. It is necessary only to address 
defendant's latter argument, since resolution of the issue he 
raises there will be dispositive of the question concerning the 
trial court's pretrial ruling. 
Defendant relies on Utah's objective test of 
entrapment, coupled with a decision from the California Supreme 
Court, People v. Mclntire. 153 Cal. Rptr. 237, 591 P.2d 527 
(1979), in arguing that under the facts of his case, he was 
entrapped through a middleman who was unwittingly employed by a 
police undercover agent to arrange the purchase of a large 
quantity of cocaine. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(1) (1978) states: 
It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
co-operation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not 
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otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
This section is patterned after MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1), which 
sets forth a purely objective test of entrapment. .£££. State v. 
Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 502-03 (Utah 1979); PERKINS and BOYCEf 
CRIMINAL LAW 1171 (3d ed. 1982). In IsxlSiL, this Court provided 
a clear definition of the objective test: 
Under the objective view of entrapment, 
the focus is not on the propensities and 
predisposition of the specific defendant, but 
on whether the police conduct revealed in the 
particular case falls below standards, to 
which common feelings respond, for the proper 
use of governmental power. This concept 
establishes entrapment on its historical 
basis; the refusal to countenance a 
perversion of justice by government 
misconduct. The objective view provides a 
solid definitive standard upon which the 
defense can rest, i.e., does the conduct of 
the government comport with a fair and 
honorable administration of justice? 
599 P.2d at 500. The objective test focuses entirely on the 
conduct of the police and their helpers; matters such as the 
defendant's character, his predisposition to commit the offense, 
and his subjective intent are irrelevant. Id. at 503; State v. 
£l±BE£, 692 P.2d 747, 750 n.3 (Utah 1984); People v. Barraza. 153 
Cal. Rptr. 459, 468 , 591 P.2d 947, 956 (1979); PERKINS and 
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BOYCE, jsiipr^  at 1171.3 
Recognizing this objective test, defendant, citing 
People v» Mclntire, urges this Court to construe § 76-2-303(1) to 
include as government agents third persons "manipulated11 by law 
enforcement officers to procure the commission of a crime by 
another, even though the third party is unaware of the law 
enforcement objective. See Mclntire, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 240, 591 
P.2d at 53 0 . However, given the context in which Mclntire was 
decided, the uncertain scope of the "unwitting agent" rule, and 
6
 The subjective test of entrapment focuses primarily on the 
defendants predisposition to commit the offense. Taylor, 599 
P.2d at 501. Under this test, the defense of entrapment is 
denied to defendants who had a preexisting criminal intent, no 
matter how overreaching the law enforcement activity may have 
been. State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 151, 369 P.2d 494, 496 
(1962); People v. Mclntire, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 239 , 591 P.2d at 
529. 
Notwithstanding the clear definition of the objective test 
provided in Taylor, this Court, in recent entrapment cases, has 
seemingly reincorporated the "predisposition" element of the 
subjective test in applying the objective test. At least this is 
suggested by the language of recent cases. For example, in State 
v. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404 (1984), the Court stated: 
[Wei conclude that the offense was induced by 
the persistent requests by [the undercover 
agent], not by the initiative and desire of 
defendant. 
680 P.2d at 406 (emphasis added). And in State v. Cripps, the 
Court at one point concluded: 
Therefore, only police conduct that "entraps" 
those ready and willing to commit the crime 
is acceptable. 
692 P.2d at 750. These statements, which do not appear to be 
consistent with either the language of § 76-2-303(1) or the 
interpretation of that statute in Taylor, are somewhat confusing. 
Presumably, the statements are not intended to modify Taylor in 
such a way as to create a hybRid objective/subjective test. j£^ e 
Cripps, 692 P.2d at 750 n.3; Taylor, 599 P.2d at 504 (opinion of 
Hall, J., concurring in result). 
-12-
the facts of defendant's casef it is not appropriate to adopt 
such an interpretation here. 
In Mclntire, the court ruled that "manipulation of a 
third party by law enforcement officers to procure the commission 
of a criminal offense by another renders the third party a 
government agent for purposes of the entrapment defense, even 
though the third party remains unaware of the law enforcement 
object," 153 Cal. Rptr. at 240, 591 P.2d at 530. However, it 
did so in the context of applying the subjective test of 
entrapment and under a fact situation suggesting extremely 
questionable police conduct. There, the police targeted a 
defendant who, according to defense testimony, never sold, used, 
or involved herself with drugs. An undercover agent allegedly 
constantly pressured defendant's teenage brother to ask defendant 
to supply marijuana, even after defendant had indicated she did 
not have any contraband and did not know where to find any. The 
defendant finally agreed to supply marijuana "only because her 
younger brother had called every day asking her to find marijuana 
and she wanted to help him because of family difficulties." With 
these alleged facts before it, the court held that entrapment 
instructions should have been given to the jury, stating: 
Such police conduct—manipulating an 
impressionable high school youth from a 
troubled family and using him to pressure his 
sister into committing a crime she was 
neither predisposed to nor desired to 
commit—constitutes precisely the sort of 
improper fostering of crime the entrapment 
defense is intended to prevent. 
The trial court apparently accepted the 
prosecution claim that entrapment cannot be 
effected through an unwitting agent; because 
defendant's brother was not aware that the 
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person importuning him to obtain marijuana 
from his sister was a police officer, the 
pressure he applied in turn to defendant was 
not for the purpose of entrapping her and the 
defense was therefore unavailable. If such 
were the law, unconscionable law enforcement 
activity would be permitted so long as the 
target of entrapping agents was not reached 
directly but indirectly through the use of 
unsuspecting dupes. Nothing in the doctrine 
of entrapment requires us to allow by 
indirection such an irrational and 
dysfunctional result. 
153 Cal. Rptr. at 240 , 491 P.2d at 530 (footnote omitted). 
Clearly, the courtfs concern was with the unconscionable police 
conduct that might be present, with respect to both the 
"unwitting agent" and the defendant. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, .£££, e.g.r State v. Griffin, 685 P.2d 546, 547 
(Utah 1984), misconduct similar to that in Mclntire was not 
present in defendant's case. Officer Hafen's contacts with 
Wells, the "unwitting" middleman, were not unconscionable either 
in number or character. Hafen simply made contact with a person 
who willingly cooperated in securing cocaine, under circumstances 
that involved no undue pressure or enticement; he did not 
instruct or direct Wells about how or from whom to obtain 
cocaine. He did nothing more than inform Wells that he was 
interested in buying a pound of cocaine, that he had sufficient 
funds with which to purchase that quantity (an amount of money 
that accurately reflected the "market" price), and that Wells 
should tell his source that Hafen had shown him the money and was 
serious about making the buy. And, no evidence was presented to 
indicate that the $2500 and/or cocaine offered to Wells for 
arranging the deal was an inordinately generous "commission." 
-14-
Furthermorer according to Wells1s testimonyf Wells made 
six or seven calls to defendant during a two month period before 
defendant agreed to sell a pound of cocaine.4 Both defendant and 
Wells testified that each time Wells called defendant up until 
the date of the transaction, defendant consistently indicated 
that he had not yet located any cocaine, but that he would keep 
looking. According to his own testimony, defendant only once 
told Wells he did not want to go through with a sale—this after 
numerous requests from Wells, None of the examples of prohibited 
conduct outlined in Taylor—i.e., "[elxtreme pleas of desperate 
illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close 
personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money—were 
present in Wells's interaction with defendant. 
Given the distinct factual differences between Mclntire 
and the instant case, it would not be appropriate to apply the 
Mclntire holding here. The "manipulation" of a third party at 
issue in Mclntire simply was not present here. Nor did the 
police target a defendant who did not appear to be involved with 
drugs; in fact, they had no idea defendant was the drug source 
until the date of the transaction. Accordingly, it is not 
necessary for this Court, in the context of this case, to decide 
whether an "unwitting agent" theory, like that applied in 
Mclntire. should be adopted in Utah. Because defendant limits 
his argument to one for the adoption of the Mclntire holding, 
which must be interpreted as highly dependent upon its facts, the 
4
 This directly contradicted defendant's testimony that Wells 
called him over fifty times during that period. 
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Court need go no further than to apply the standard objective 
test to the facts presented. Under that testf the factsr viewed 
in a light most favorable to the verdictf do not reflect any 
police conduct directed at defendant that rises to the level of 
entrapment* Even if it were assumed for purposes of argument 
that the conduct of the third party, Wellsf could be imputed to 
the police,5 that conduct, as described by Wells's testimony, 
also cannot fairly be characterized as improper or 
unconsci onable. 
In sum, the evidence presented at defendant's trial did 
not raise a reasonable doubt on the issue of entrapment, even 
under defendant's theory of the case. See State v. Kourbelas. 
621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980)). The instant case is clearly 
distinguishable from Kourbelas and State v. Sprague, 680)P.2d 404 
(Utah 1984) , where the concern was that undercover officers 
persisted in attempting to purchase drugs without any prior 
reason to believe that the defendants were using or selling 
drugs. Although conflicting testimony was given at trial, the 
jury was not obligated to believe the evidence most favorable to 
defendant rather than that presented in opposition by the state. 
^ It is unclear whether the Mclntire rule is consistent with Utah 
law. Sas Taylorf 599 P.2d at 500 ("Entrapment, as a defense, is 
not available to one who is induced by a private person to commit 
a crime.") Significantly, other jurisdictions have rejected the 
"unwitting agent" theory. Seef e.g.f State v. Luster, 295 S.E.2d 
421, 425 (N. C. 1982) (rejecting the notion that, for entrapment, 
the definition of agent includes "an unwitting third party who, 
presented with an opportunity to commit the offense by an 
undercover officer, then induces defendant's participation in the 
offense without specific direction from the officer"); jCLf• Soto 
v. State, 681 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Cr. App. 1984). 
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State v . Howell, 649 P.2d 91 , 97 (Utah 1982) . And on review, 
t h i s Court " i s obl iged t o accept that vers ion of the f a c t s which 
supports the v e r d i c t . " State v. Isaacson, Utah P.2d , No. 
19669, s l i p op. a t 1 ( f i l e d July 29, 1985). Therefore, the 
j u r y ' s conclus ion that defendant was not entrapped should be 
upheld. There being no dispute as t o the su f f i c i ency of the 
evidence t o support the convict ion for d i s t r i b u t i o n , defendant's 
conv ic t ion should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, defendant's 
conv ic t ion should be affirmed. ~^#~~— 
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$15,000 i n p r o f i t i s a l o t of money. And t o a man who i s 
no th ing but a doorman a t a bar and offered $2500 i s a lo t 
3 I of money. 
4 In regard to the word agent, let's just take a 
5 look at the statute. The statute says entrapment occurs 
c when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or 
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission 
8 I of an offense in order to obtain evidence, et cetera. I 
9 donft say that the person has to be knowingly and known that 
he is working with a law enforcement officer. 
In this case the officer committed a fraud upon 
one person in order to entrap somebody else. But the statute 
is much broader than that. Direct words are it is direct, 
and I think we would show that he directed him and told him 
to call Mr. Martin. Or act in cooperation. Of course he 
was acting in cooperation with him. 
So I submit that under the Utah statute this is 
•jg I entrapment. It is, the case should be dismissed as a matter 
of law. 
THE COURT: Well, gentlemen, 1 have 
heard the evidence in this matter. I am going to rule that 
the motion of the defense is not well taken. Deny the 
motion. 
I feel that first the conflict in testimony is 

















donft think it is complete. 1 arr. not saying that if I 
believed everything that defense said that 1 would rule in 
3 I their favor, but what I am saying is the testimony is so 
4 directly opposed that I think it is a question that 1 am 
5 not going to rule on entrapment or dismiss the action for 
c J entrapment. 
And secondly, of course, which 1 indicated 
8 | previously to you, I do not feel that the persuasion by the 
contact man, by Mr. Wells on Mr. Martin was sufficient 
entrapment for Mr. Wells to be dismissed out of this case 
H i on entrapment. So I deny the motion, 
32 J MR. ROSS: You mean Mr. Martin. 
MR. BOYDEN: You mean Mr. Martin 
THE COURT: T am sorry. 
]5 I MR, ROSS: You said it was not sufficient 
36 i evidence for Mr. Wells to be dismissed. 
jT I THE COURT: Mr. Martin to be dismissed, 
38 I yes, 
}(• | (Thereupon Court adjourned at 5:05 p.m.) 
90 
13 
34 
